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Kant's Apathology of Compassion 
Wolfram Bergande 
Now reason's ability eo become mascer over all ehe inclinacions striving against ic chrough ehe mere 
idea of a law is absolucely inexplicable, hence it is also incomprehensible how ehe senses could have 
ehe ability co become master over a reason which commands wich such authority on ics side. For if 
all the world proceeded in accordance wich ehe precepc of ehe law, we would say chat everything oc-
curred according co ehe order of nature, and nobody would think even of inquiring afcer ehe cause. 
-Immanuel Kant, Religion within the boundaries of mere reason' 
Christianity has assuredly taught men eo pay litrle attention co God's jouissance, and this is how 
Kant makes pass his volunrarism ofLaw-for-Law's-sake, which is something that cops, one might 
say, the ataraxia of the Scoic experience. 
-Lacan, Kant with Sade2 
1. Tue Moral Pleasure of Respect 
In his critical works, e. g. in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant employs the weil-
known and seemingly clear-cut distinction between sensuousness, Sinnlichkeit, on 
the one hand and undcrstanding, Verstand, respectively reason, Vernunft, on the 
other, hence between thc "physical" (Kant 1889, pp. 122, 133) laws governing hu-
man nature and the moral law, the categorical imperative, which ought to govern 
the individual's will and thence, at least in principle, his or her acts, too. 3 Kant's 
moral philosophy accordingly seems to divide into two aspects: into what on the 
one hand could be called a pathology, taking care of reason as it tends to get hete-
ronomously, i. e. sensuously affected or even passionately so; and, on the other, into 
what could not unjusdy be called an 'apathology' which secures the grounds for an 
unaffected and dispassionate morality. This apathology comes close to a praxeolo-
gy; even if Kant, unlike the Stoies or the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, does not 
Kant 1996, p. 102f. (Footnote t); cf. Kant 2007, 06: 059. 
Lacan 2006a, p. 651 f. (Translation modified.) 
Cf. Wood 2015, 132ff. 
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depart from an absolute Other (an almighty God) but only postulates his existence 
and his eventual afterworldly reward for a moral life. 
For Kant, feelings, Gefühle, respectively sentiments, Empfindungen, almost inva-
riably fall under physical laws, hence under the aspect of pathology. "[E]very feeling 
generally" (Kant 1889, p. 167) is "pathological" (ibid.), writes Kant in the second 
Critique, literally so because feelings ultimately derive from the subject's pathe, from 
its physical nature, and critically because they tend to encroach upon the autonomy 
of moral reason. However, already in the second Critique there is one-although only 
one single-exception to this rule: the "singular" "moral feeling" of "respect'', Ach-
tung (Kant 1889, p. 169). Being "produced simply by reason" (Kant 1889, p. 169), 
ir is a case sui generis, even if compared with the somewhat similar aesthetic feelings 
which Kant will introduce only later in the Critique of judgement. 4 Standing out as 
an exceptionally "practical" (Kant 1889, p. l 72f.) feeling, respect accompanies those 
and only those wills which are morally good because they would be grounded in pure 
reason. Practically, this means that the will in question would be absolutely clcansed 
even of the "slightest admixture" (Kant 1889, p. 112) of pathological (sentimental, as 
it were) causaliry. As a matter of fact, later, in thc Critiquc of Judgement, Kant will 
explicate thar actually "any determination of the will" as such would carry a "state 
of mind which accompanies" it; and that this state of mind "is in itsclf a feeling of 
plcasure and identical with it" (Kant 1914, p. 70). 5 So is respect,Achtung, then a 
pleasure? Kanr's answer must appear somewhat paradoxical: yes and no. Yes, because 
given that respect is a determination of the will, it must be idenrical with a feeling of 
4 Cf. Kant 1886, p. 115: Ir "is encirely of irs own kind". 
5 Cf. Kant 1914, p. 53: "Bur ro will somerhing, and ro have a sadsfaction in irs exisrence, i. e. ro rake an imerest in 
ir, are idemical." 
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pleasure, too. No, bccause the feeling of respect actually suggests itself as exemplary 
for the "moral pleasure [moralischen Lust]" (Kant 2007, 06: 378, 391; Kant 1889, 
pp. 289, 301) of which Kant writes in 1797 in the Metaphysic of Ethics; and as 'mo-
ral pleasure' respect is far from being a pleasure in the ordinary sense of the term. 
This is because the dctermination of the will by the "practical law" (Kant 1889, 
p. 112), which occasions the feeling of respect, makes a very special case for Kant. 
Even if one insisted on calling respect a 'pleasure', namely a 'moral pleasure', it ne-
vertheless would not involve any kind of 'pathological' pleasure, neither in the sense 
of presupposing it, nor of feeding on it, nor of aiming at it. As Kant claims in the 
Critique of Practical Reason: 
Reason, with its practical law, determines rhe will immediately, not by means of an intervening 
feeling of pleasure or pain, not even of pleasure in the law itself [nicht vermittelst eines dazwischen 
kommenden Gefohls der Lust und Unlust, selb.rt nicht an diesem Gesetze], and it is only because it can, 
as pure reason, be practical, that it is possible for it eo be legislative (ibid.; Kant 2007, 05: 025). 
Nor is respect itself, as seems to go without saying at this point in Kant's text, a 
pathological 'pleasure in the law itself' eithcr. All of this holds true for Kant even 
though the determination of the will, as he admits, implies a somewhat painful fee-
ling of "humiliation" of one's "self-conceit" (Kant 1889, p. 167)6, a feeling of pain 
which, although it is not a pleasure, would have to count as "pathological" (ibid.) 
in equal measure, if only it was not indeed the negative reverse of the feeling of res-
pcct and thus, according to Kant, another major "effect of the consciousness of the 
moral law" (ibid.).7 
So not only is it that the moral feeling of respect would not in any way involve 
or imply 'pathological' feelings. What is more, it "cannot be compared to any patho-
6 Cf.Kantl889,p.173. 
Cf. Kant 1889, p. 213. 
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logical feeling" (ibid., p. 169) in the first place, !et alone itselfbe "reckoned either as 
pleasure or pain" (ibid., p. 173) in the ordinary, 'pathological' sense, for it "[„.] is a 
feeling that applies merely to what is practical, and depends on the conception of a 
law, simply as to its form, not on account of any object [„.]" (ibid.). lt is "produced 
by an imellecrual cause" only (Kam 1889, p. 166). And that is also why it "is the only 
one that we know quite a priori, and the necessity of which we can discern [einsehen 
kännen]" (ibid.).8 So much does respect grow from purely reasonable grounds alone 
that even though for the sake of convenience one might call it a 'moral pleasure' it 
nevertheless and strictly speaking "comains no pleasure" (Kam 1889, p. 173) at all 
(nor pain, at least if we leave its negative reverse, humiliation, aside). 
What the feeling of respect actually does consist of phenomenologically speaking 
is, according to Kam, a cerrain kind of"selfapprobation" which "contains something 
elevating' (ibid.), a kind of"inward peace" (Kam 1889, p. 181).9 More prccisely, it 
is a "comentment, which is primarily contentment with one's own person" (ibid., 
p. 215), however far from it's opposite double: complacency, Behaglichkeit. This con-
tentmem or self-comemmem may cerrainly amoum to some kind of "enjoymem" 
(ibid.), as Kam admits. However, "comemmem (acquiesceritia)" in the full meaning 
of the term is "unattainable" for human beings "during life" (Kam 2006, p. 130). 
And, what is more, the comemmem that is evemually attainable for humans is only 
"a negative satisfaction with onc's state" (Kant 1889, p. 215). lt yields an only ne-
gative enjoyment, one which has "nothing to do with enjoymem of life" (ibid., p. 
183) in the ordinary sense and 
8 Transla(ion modified. 
Kant also writes of a "Vernunftliebe seiner selbst", foornote *'in Kam 2007, 06: 045. 
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[ ... ] which cannot be called happiness, because it does not depend on the positive concurrence of a 
feeling, nor is it, strictly speaking, bliss, since it does not include complete independence on incli-
nations and wants, but ir resembles bliss in so far as the determination of one's will at least can hold 
itself free from their inAuence; and thus, at least in its origin, this enjoyment is analogous to the 
self-suf!iciency which we can ascribc only ro the Supreme Being (ibid„ p. 215). 
For the worldly human being who seeks to practically emulatc this self-sufficient 
Supreme Being, comentment spells out as the moral virtue of "apathy" (Kam 2006, 
p. 152) or "equanimiry" (Kam 2006, p. 131), rarely also as: "ataraxia, Ataraxia" 
(Kam 2006, p. 154; Kam 2007, 07: 256). 1° Kam repeatedly recommends or even 
commands apathy (e. g.: the "dury of apathy" (Kam 1886, p. 226) in the Metaphy-
sics of Ethics ( 1797)), usually with an explicit reference to anciem Sroicism, like in 
the following passage from the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point oJView (1798): 
'Ihe principle of aparhy-namely that the wise man must never be in a state of affect, not even in 
that of compassion with the misfortune of his best friend, is an entirely correct and sublime moral 
principle of the Stoic school; for affect makes us (more or less) blind (Kant 2006, p. 152). 
If the twin feelings of humiliation-and-respect together make up the moral con-
temmem of the human being, then we could say that something like countenance 
(like 'comemmem' deriving from the Latin continere, 'to hold together, to enclose') 
is the respective practical disposition of an individual's "moral ascetics" (Kam 2005, 
p. 597; Kam 2007, 6: 484). In thc Metaphysics of Ethics, Kam refers this "cultivati-
on of virtue" (ibid.) to "the old watchword of the Stoa[. „], bear andforbear. bear, 
cndure the evils of lifc without complaim; forbear, abstain from its superfluous en-
joymems [überflüssigen Ergätzlichkeiten]" (Kant 1886, p. 304). The virtuous human 
being ought to stay apathctic in the face of pathology, i. e. in the face of any senti-
mems/fcelings, affccts and passions, whether pleasurable or painful. This is bccause 
they constantly threaten to infringe upon the purely moral determination of the will. 
IO Cf. "Ataraxia" in Kant 2007, 07: 256. On "ataraxia" as "Gleichmtithigkeit" (equanimiry) see: "Entwürfe zu dem 
Colleg über Anthropologie aus den 70er und 80er Jahren" (Kant 2007, p. 15: 854). 
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Sure enough, rhis does nor mean w be "dull" or "indifferent" (Kant 2006, p. 131 ), 
as Kant hasrens ro add in ehe Anthropology. 
However, ir can lead w quire exrrcme consequences. Kant's nororious example, 
which appears in borh ehe Anthropology (Kant 2007, 07: 253; Kant 2006, p. 152) 
and ehe Metaphysics of Ethics (Kant 2007, 06: 457; Kant 1886, p. 276), is ehe re-
jection of compassion, Mitleid, as a form of parhological suffering. Kant's referee in 
the Metaphysics is again the Stoic "sage" who "rejected compassion [Mitleidenschaft]" 
even in "the case ofhis friend" because he could not "allow" himself-and as to Kant 
indeed he ought not to allow himself-"to be infected by his [friend's] sorrow" and 
thus to "augment the evils in the world" (ibid.) by suffering rogerher wich him. 11 For 
the Kant of the Metaphysics rhis is tantamount to saying that as a maner of princip-
le "rhere can be no obligation to act kindly our of compassion [Mitleidj" (ibid.). 12 
2. Compassion as Surrogate of Reason 
But this is not the whole story. For in the Anthropology, Kant continues the above 
quoted passage about the 'principle of apathy' with an important reservation: 
Nevertheless the wisdom of nature has planred in us the predisposit'ion to compassion in order to 
handle the reins provisionally, unril reason has achieved the necessary strengrh; that is to say, for rhe 
purpose of enlivening us, nature has added the incentive of pathological (sensible) [pathologischen 
(sinnlichen}] impulse to the moral incentives for the good, as a temporary surrogate of reason [einst-
weiliges Surrogat der Vernunft] (Kant 2006, p. 152). 
And in the Metaphysics of Ethics, in a section titled 0/ the Duty of Sympathy, Kant 
continues the discussion of this "predisposition of nature", namely of the natural 
predisposition "to have a fellow-feeling with the joys and sorrows [Mitfreude und 
Mitleid (sympathia moralis)] of others [Anderer]" (Kant 1886, p. 275; Kant 2007, 
11 Translarion modified. 
12 Translation modified. Cf Denis 2000. 
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06: 456). 13 Here, these two feelings, Mitfreude (compassionate joy, so to speak) and 
Mitleid (compassion), appear under the category of ''sympathia moralis" (Kant 2007, 
06: 456), which is somewhat paradoxical given that Kant maintains that we are und-
oubtedly dealing with sensuous feelings, ''sinnliche Gefühle", thus obviously not with 
moral but instead with aesthetical, 'ä'sthetisch" (ibid.), i. e. with ultimately patholo-
gical feelings. This paradox notwithstanding, Kant infers from the 'predisposition 
of nature' to have such sympathetic feelings if not a direct 'obligation to act kindly 
out of compassion' (which, as we just have learned, cannot be) then nevertheless an 
"indirect duty [„.] to cultivate the [se] sympathetic affections" (Kant 1886, p. 276). 
So surprisingly here we are called on by Kant not to repress the naturally pa-
thological feeling of Mitleid, compassion. Instead we are to cultivate it. To allow for 
this cultivation, Kant is led to introduce a further distinction between a natural and 
a cultivated kind of sympathy; this distinction temporarily resolves the paradoxical 
categorization just mentioned, it is true, but only at the cost of reapplying the prima-
ry distinction between morality and pathology, i. e. between Achtung (respect) and 
Mitleid (compassion or sympathy, respectively), within the subsphere of pathology 
itself, i. e. within the subsphere of compassion (respectively sympathy). So within this 
subsphere we face again the second Critique's primary distinction between morality 
and pathology: namely between a "free" and morally cultivated compassion which 
is 'participating' ( ''theilnehmend" (Kant 2007, 06: 456) and "seated in the will and 
the ability to communicate to one another" and which "depends on practical reason" 
(Kant 1886, p. 276) 14, if however, as we will learn, not on practical reason alone-
and a slavish, ''servilis" (Kant 2007, 06: 457), and pathologically admixed or soaked 
13 Translation modified. 
14 Translation modified. 
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compassion, a "Mitleidenschaft" (ibid.), which by contrast is "seated in that physical 
susceptibility, which nature has implanted in us, for feeling in common the delights 
or misery of our neighbour" (Kant 1886, p. 275f.). This latter Mitleidenschaftcom-
municates itselfby itself. By itself it is ''mittheilend" (Kant 2007, 06: 457). lt 'spreads 
in a natural way', ''sie sich ... natürlicher Weise verbreitet", comparable to 'warmth', 
"W'firme'', or 'contagious diseases', "ansteckender Krankheiten" (ibid.). By contrast to 
its counterpart, it is not a duty, not even an indirect one, but must remain repressed 
and avoided by all means. 
So if there is, as we have learned in the Anthropology, 'the incentive of pathologi-
cal (sensible) impulse to the moral incentives for the good, as a temporary surrogate 
of reason', then we can conclude from the Metaphysics of Ethics that this surrogate 
impulse is not straightforwardly pathological but the result of cultivation. And the 
Metaphysics seems to agree with the Anthropology as to why at all we should cultiva-
te 'compassionate natural (aesthetical) affections', ''mitleidige natürliche (ästhetische) 
Gefühle" (Kant 2007, 06: 457). We should do so because we can "[. „] make them 
serve as instruments enabling us to discharge the offices of a humane mind, upon 
ethical principles [sie als so viele Mittel zur lheilnehmung au/moralischen Grundsätzen 
und dem ihnen gemäßen Gefühl zu benutzen]" (Kant 1886, p. 276). Particularly, we 
may use them in cases where practical reason is in need of support; for instance, as 
we read in the Anthropology, 'provisionally, until reason has achieved the necessary 
strength'. However, only insofar as they effectively serve such purposes should we 
cultivate them, that is, only insofar as they are directed to an active end. Otherwise 
they are useless, as Kant warns in the Anthropology: " [ ... ] the ineffectual sharing of 
one's feelings [die thatleere lheilnehmung seines Gefühls] in order to appear sympa-
18 1 
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thetically in tune with the feelings of others, thus allowing oneself to be affected in 
a merely passive way, is silly and childish" (Kant 2006, p. 132). 
Still this is not the end of what can be termed Kant's apathology of compassi-
on. If the Metaphysics calls on us to cultivate natural compassion, i. e. the sensuous 
sympathy with others: "humanitas aesthetica" (Kant 2007, 06: 456), and to trans-
form it into truly humane compassion: "humanitas practica" (ibid.) as it 'depends 
on practical reason', then this is not so much because, as Kant considers, "we might 
be unable to repress" (Kant 1886, p. 277) it anyway; nor is it only because com-
passion can function as a temporary surrogate impulse for the possibly deficitary 
'strength' of practical reason; rather, and this is astonishing, compassion can help us 
"to do what the representation of duty on its own might be unable to accomplish 
[dasjenige zu tun, was die Pflichtvorstellung.für sich allein nicht ausrichten würde]" 
(ibid.) 15, as Kant surprisingly concedes towards the end of the Metaphysics' section 
on the Duty ofSympathy: 
Neither ought we to desert the chambers of the sick nor the cells of the debtor, in order to escape 
the painful sympathy we might be unable to repress, this emotion being a spring implanted in us 
by nature, prompting us to do what the representation of dury on its own might be unable to ac-
complish (Kant 1886, p. 276f.). 16 
There are-as Kant lets his readers know in what is a rather passing albeit conclu-
ding remark-actions commanded as duties by practical reason, and, as can be 
presumed, strengthfully so. Nevertheless, 'the representation of duty alone' does not 
suffice to determine the will effectively-presumably regardless of the support of 
the concomitant feeling of Achtung, respect. So obviously it is not only, as the An-
thropology suggests, some temporary and hence sooner or later remediable deficit of 
15 Translation modified. 
16 Translation modifi~d. 
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'rhe strength of reason' which compassion, the 'pathological surrogate of reason', is 
supposed to supplement in a however culrivated form. Rather, the Metaphysics seems 
to point here to a fundamental problem one might have with doing one's dury as it 
is commanded by the practical law alone. Can we not suspect that in extreme cases 
this problem might indeed become irremediable without the 'positive concurrence' 
of a cultivated 'pathological feeling'? And would not rhis consequendy pur the self-
contentment of rhe virruous agent in danger, together with the ideal of supreme 
self-sufficiency that orientates i t? 
One must be very precise here. Kant writes that "[ ... ] although it is no direct 
duty to rake apart in the joy or grief of others", it neverrheless "is a dury not to avo-
id" the occasions and places where such feelings are usually triggered: "rhe chambers 
of the sick" or the "cells of the debror" (Kant 1886, p. 276). Even so, the feeling of 
the 'joy or grief of others' must remain problematic for Kant, like any of the other 
"inner and ourer enjoyments" of everyday life: "only inasmuch as they are innocent 
in themselves, i. e., not contrary to moraliry, and present themselves spontaneously, 
may we adopt rhem, but never go in pursuit of them" (Kant 2001 b, p. 397), as we 
learn from rhe notes taken by Johann Friedrich Vigilantius from Kant's lectures on 
ethics in 1793-94. Otherwise, Kant warns, they indeed might be "injurious to our 
self-contentment" (ibid.). As a consequence, it seems as if cases where cultivared 
compassion is asked for must neither actively be sought nor actively be avoided. If 
compassion arises, it must arise spontaneously, unintentionally. This probably also 
implies rhat such cases must not be passively sought nor be passively avoided eit-
her, i. e.: negligently or secretly. A perfectly balanced state of neirher activity nur 
passiviry is obviously what is at stake when it comes to the morally obligatory self-
contentment of Kant's virtuoso of virtue. 
20 1 
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Be this as it may, the remarkable resu!t is that Kant seems to allow for cases where 
rhe 'representation of dury on its own' [die Pflichtvorstellung.für sich allein], obviously 
because it is on its own, is not enough to determine the will; not just factually, e. g. 
because it would be overpowered by other pathological motives, "Triebfedern" (Kant 
2007, 06: 036), or because it would lack the experience which enlivens or enhances 
its strength (and even granted that the effective outcome is always indeterminable 
because empirical), but principally-namely, as one may suspect, because without 
intuition the Pflichtvorstellungwould be just as void, "leer" (Kant 2007, 03: 075) as 
it would then become "blind" or rather blinded under the rule of an uncultivared 
"affect" (Kant 2006, p. 152). Is rhis an overinterpretation? Certainly, Kant would 
have rejected any such interpretation, just like his Metaphysics explicitly opposes any 
such view. For if, according to Kant, "the power of mastering every opposing excite-
ment of the sensory can, and indeed must, be absolurely postulated [das Vermögen 
(facu!tas) der Überwindung aller sinnlich entgegenwirkenden Antriebe seiner Freiheit 
halber schlechthin vorausgesetzt werden kann und muß'J" (Kant 1886, p. 2 l 4f.; Kant 
2007, 06: 397), then in principle reason must be rhe absolute master. Yet the ques-
tion remains wherher Kant's systematic treatment of compassion does not point to 
a fundamental problem wirh reason's principally absolute mastery, particularly in 
regard to Kant's famous coordination of freedom and constraint ('you can becausc 
you must'). The first epigraph to this text, taken from Kant's Religion within the 
Boundaries of Mere Reason, is one of a small number of scattercd marginalia in Kant's 
corpus which appear to reflect such a problematic. 
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And yet recent secondary literature on Kant often appcars to ignore this prob-
lematic. To give an example: lt certainly is not altogether wrong to interpret Kant's 
text-as has been clone-in the conventional sense that "only ehe moral feeling of 
Achtung, which is exclusively triggered by the practical law and which has an inner 
causal relation to the practical law, can guarantee that it only motivates to moral 
actions" (Goy 2007, p. 352). lt is not wrong, bur it understates the case, because, as 
has just been evidenced in Kant's text, there seem to be at least imaginable cases in 
which a 'temporary surrogate impulse' not only "may later facilitate our doing our 
dury" (Carcwright 1984, p. 87 Fn. 11) or cases in which it "can be of instrumental 
importance" (Denis 2000, p. 65), as other interpreters of Kant have it; but also cases 
in which such a surrogate impulse might be indispensable for doing our duties in 
ehe first place. A 'temporary surrogate impulse' then may be principally indispen-
sable for a 'representation of duty' which, 'on its own' as it in some cases obviously 
is, without such an im pulse, without an as it were Fichtean '/tnstoß" (Fichte 2013, 
p. 37) avant la lettre, cannot perform its moral duty. 17 (And then again, if chere in-
dccd are such exceptional cases in which moral reason principally cannot dispense of 
this Surrogate im pulse, then of course the question arises as to how Achtung should 
be able to 'guarantee that it only motivates to moral actions' in all the other cases.) 
Now on ehe other hand it is not only to overstate the case but just wrong to argue 
(as has been clone by one interpreter in the recenrly published Kant-Lexikon) chat 
"the natural feelings of compassion [die natürlichen Gefühle des Mitleids]" would be 
"necessary conditions of the accomplishment of charity [notwendigen Bedingungen 
zur Erfüllung der Wohltätigkeit]", even granted that they are "not sufficient for the 
17 Cf Honneth 2001. 
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accomplishment of the moral dury of charity [nicht hinreichend zur Erfüllung der 
moralischen Pflicht zur Wohltätigkeit]" (Mieth 2015, p. 413). 18 Natural compassion is 
a condition of cultivated compassion, so much is true. Just like "[ ... ) the sensible fee-
ling which is at the bottom of all our inclinations is the condition of chat impression 
which we call respect, Achtung' (Kant 1889, p. 168; Kant 2007, 05: 075) according 
to the Critique of Practical Reason. But in the Metaphysics Kant is quite clear about 
that "painful sympathy [schmerzhaften Mitgefüh~ [ ... ) being a spring [einer der ... 
Antriebe] implanted in us by nature" (Kant 1886, p. 277): lt is one of ehe springs to 
do good, einer der Antriebe, not the only one. Hence compassion (Mitleid respec-
tively Mitgefühb, whether in natural or cultivated form, cannot be a necessary, i. e. a 
general condition of charity; nor can any other feeling be such a necessary condition, 
except Achtung. In the second Critique, Kant leaves no doubt about it: "There is here 
in the subject no amecedem feeling tending ro morality. For this is impossible, since 
every feeling is sensuous, and the motive of moral intention must be free from all 
sensuous conditions [die Triebfeder der sittlichen Gesinnung aber muß von aller sinn-
liehen Bedingung.frei sein]" (Kant 1889, p. 168). 19 Otherwise there could actually 
be no cases at all in which, as Kant claims, moral "[r]eason, wich its practical law, 
determines the will immediately, not by means of an intervening feeling of pleasure 
or pain, not even of pleasure in the law itself, [ ... )" (ibid., p. 112). And according 
to Kant "practical pure reason" does determine ehe will, not only immediately but 
also effectively. lt is not only ehe "objective determining principlc of ehe objects of 
action as called good and evil" but also the "subjective determining principle, that 
is, a motive [Triebfeder] to this action [ ... )" (ibid., p. 168; Kant 2007, 05: 075). 
18 My uanslation. 
19 Translation rnodified. 
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As a result, compassion, i. e. the pathological affection, if not infectedness, by 
somebody else's feelings, appears as quite paradoxical, as quite Rousseauistic so co 
speak, at lease in chese cwo ultimate publications of Kant, ehe Metaphysics and ehe 
Anthropology. Both inessential and necessary, it appears co be an undecidable in 
ehe technical sense of deconscructive cerminology. On ehe one hand compassion is 
ruled out as pathological by ehe auchoricy of reason; either because it is an evil which 
must not be engaged wich nor unnecessarily mulciplied, like in ehe case of a friend's 
suffering, which can only be 'endured wichout complaint' if need be; or because it 
would have co be classified as 'superfluous enjoyment' from which one must 'abs-
tain', like-che example is Kanc's-che "offensive variety of chis compassion called 
mercy, by which is meant thac kind of benevolence shown eo ehe unworchy" which 
only serves co "boast" one's own "worchiness co be happy" (Kant 1886, p. 276). 20 
As a merely 'added' extra, compassion seems eo add noching really necessary co ehe 
good will, which is self-sufficient from ehe moral point of view. In any case, as Kant 
emphasizes, one just cannot be obliged co be compassionace, just like "love", being 
a natural "affection", simply, i. e. nacurally, "cannot be commanded" (Kant 1889, 
p. 15)-even chough as far as "love" is concerned, it may accually appear as anal-
most "indispensable complement" eo ehe moral Pflichtvorstellung's "command of 
ducy", given chac "ehe laccer as an incentive, withouc ehe contribucion of ehe former 
[i. e.: oflove], is not very much eo be counted on'', as Kant concedes in The end of 
all things (Kant 2007, 08: 338; Kant 200lc, p. 230). On ehe ocher hand and 'practi-
cally' speaking, chis added surrogate seems co be essential, at least in chose particular 
cases in which compassion incices reason co leave its abscracc 'representation of dury 
20 Translarion modified. 
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on its own' and eo not only will but eo also act according co ehe categorical impera-
tive. Thence for Kant it becomes an 'indirect ducy' not co foreclose on ehe real life 
occasions in which compassion can possibly affect or rather infect ehe moral agent, 
driving him towards its cultivation. 
From this it follows chac, paradoxically, compassion is boch on either side and 
beyond ehe Scoic dichotomy 'bear and forbear' co which Kant refers. lt is not really 
concained by chac dichocomy, neither logically nor 'practically'; andin case compassi-
on should be contained, it gets excluded from 'practical' reason, at least theoretically. 
Conversely, insofar as compassion should be beyond chis dichotomy, it gets never-
cheless included inco 'practical' reason, needed as it is eo incite eo dfective action in 
exceptional cases. So, paradoxically, it is boch excluded and included within 'practi-
cal', i. e. moral reason. Ics logic can chus be reconstructed as follows: Kant's concept 
of moral subjectivicy firscly excludes compassion, namely either as a pathological 
object of ehe will or 'as commanded'; yec it is precisely in chis excluded compassion 
where ehe subject, secondly, rediscovers a therewich excluded part of icself; hence it 
chirdly and laboriously undercakes eo recover chis part by saving compassion in ehe 
form of cultivated (albeit 'painful') sympathy (which is not a ducy but which not eo 
avoid is an 'indirect ducy'). Here one can see how Kant's concept of moral subjecti-
vicy becomes quite twisced as it seeks co save not ehe appearances but, so eo speak, 
ehe noumena. "The subject is, as it were, internally excluded from its object [en ex-
clusion interne a son objet]" (Lacan 2006b, p. 731 ), as can be stated here wich Lacan. 
Compassion marks ehe inner oucland of ehe subject, subjected as it is eo an allegedly 
purely rational moral law. And it is chrough cultivaced compassion chac ehe subjecc's 
apathy, its disposition eo will and act morally, i. e. humbly and respectfully at ehe 
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same time, entertains an encrypted, i. e. encapsulated and hardly decipherable, com-
munication with the pathological feelings of the social other-and eventually with 
his or her own pathological feelings, as it would be in the case of compassion with 
oneself, i. e. of self-pity, a concept which, not surprisingly, is alien to Kant's corpus. 
So if for some moment Kant may have appeared to dismiss any form of patholo-
gical feeling as supplementary to intellectual reason alone (by the way quite similar 
to Plato's Socrates who e. g. in the Republic21 dismisses even the artistically staged 
feelings of tragedy and comedy), then it must now be clear that some rhetorical 
dismissals norwithstanding Kant straightforwardly accepts a more or less cultivated 
compassion as a natural supplement to moral reason. Making solitary reason leave 
its purely intellectual, i. e. unpractical (if not immoral) abstractions, truly humane 
and thus virtuously charitable compassion is attending, '~heilnehmend" (Kant 2007, 
06: 456), but not properly communicative, "mittheilend" (ibid.: 457). Thus it comes 
close to-but is not identical with-the communicable, mitteilbar aesthetic feeling 
of the Critique of judgement. 
3. Morality and its Discontents 
All things considered, compassion, Mitleiden{schaft), remains a problematical feeling 
in Kant's late theory of moral virtue, whether principally or only factually, already 
because it will not always be possible to critically distinguish berween natural and 
cultivated compassion; nor berween cultivated compassion and 'boasting mercy'; 
moreover, and more imporrantly, because in order to properly function as a sup-
plement to reason, cultivated compassion is contingent upon the repression of the 
21 Cf. e. g. Rep. 413a; 429c-d; 606a ff. 
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double of the feeling of respect, Achtung, namely upon the repression of the ominous 
'pleasure in the law itself'. This is because it is precisely with cultivated compassi-
on that Kant gets disquietingly close to such a commanded pleasure. Certainly, for 
Kant there simply is not anything like a commanded pleasure-the feeling of Ach-
tung norwithstanding, as it is supposed to be not a 'pleasure in the law itself' but a 
pleasure on the mere occasion of that law; and the same would apply to the "moral 
pleasure (moralischen Lust)" or "moral enjoyment (moralischen Genuss)" which, as to 
Kant's Metaphysics, may be the "reward" (Kant 1886, p. 207; Kant 2007, 06: 391) 
of virtuously charitable actions. 
Yet at closer inspection Kant's scattered remarks on the ominous topic of a 'ple-
asure in the law itself' and on a possibly 'commanded' feeling appear quite cont-
radictory: On the one band it must remain true for Kant that 'any determination 
of the will' is a 'feeling of pleasure'.22 And the prime case for such a determination 
of the will, namely the will's determination by the moral law and the concomitant 
feeling of Achtung, is something which even forces itself upon us, "sich für sich selbst 
uns aufdringt" 23 (Kant 2007, 05: 031).24 So remarkably, Achtung results as a 'mo-
ral pleasure' which the moral law forces upon us. However it is supposed to be no 
'pleasure in the law itself'. On the other band, Kant asserts in a footnote to his dis-
cussion of the sources of the aesthetic feeling in the Critique of]udgement that "[a]n 
obligation to enjoyment is a manifest absurdity [Eine Verbindlichkeit zum Genießen ist 
eine offenbare Ungereimtheit]." And he continues: "Thus the obligation to all actions 
22 Cf Kam 2007, 06: 211; 05: 178. 
23 Kant's wording here is inceresting: In the scrictest sense ehe moral law not just forces icself upon us, bur it "forces 
itself for itself [sich for sich selbst] upon us", as if this force would act on behalf of itself, like another subject, and not on 
behalf of e. g. a desired outcome, namely the subjectivation of the thus moralized individual. 
24 Cf. Kant 2007, 06: 036. 
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which have merely enjoyment for their aim can only be a pretended one; however 
spiritually it may be conceived (or decked out), even if it is a mystical, or so-called 
heavenly, enjoyment." (Kant 1914, p. 52 Fn. 2; Kant 2007, 05: 209, Fn. *)So whe-
reas the moral law obliges the subject to the painful humiliation of its seif resulting 
in the 'moral pleasure' of Achtung, it nevertheless does not oblige, it cannot oblige 
according to Kant, to enjoy pathologically, because that would be, according to this 
marginal assertion, manifestly absurd from a logical point of view. There is a similar 
argument in a passage from the Vigilantius-notes. There one can read that 'to enjoy 
having duties' would be 'contrary to the nature of duty' ('nature' here metaphorically 
in the sense of essence and not of physical quality). And one can paraphrase Kant 
in that passage by saying that to enjoy duties would be symptomatic of 'impulses' 
standing under the inacceptable 'authority' of 'painful or despotic commands': 
[ ... ] it is also certain that every obligation is forthwith associared wich a moral constraint, and thar 
ir is contrary to the nature of duty to enjoy having duties incumbent upon one; it is necessary, rather, 
that man's impulses should make him disinclined to fulfill rhe moral laws, and that these impulses 
should be overcome only rhrough ehe authority of ehe latter, without it being possible to say rhat 
these laws demand respect in ehe manner of painful or despotic commands" (Kant 200lb, p. 259).25 
Now to enjoy one's submission to a prohibitory law and to take this culpable enjoy-
ment as a libidinally "regressive surrogate [regressiver Ersa~]" (Freud 1973, p. 240) 
for the enjoyment of the object prohibited by that law is exemplary for the "essence 
of masochism" (ibid., p. 241) as perversion according to Sigmund Freud's seminal 
text A Child is Being Beaten. So obviously what Kant excludes as a double of Achtung, 
throughout all these contradictory statements on the topic of a forced enjoyment, 
and without really getting at it, is something similar to what moral masochism is for 
Freud: pleasure in the law itself. As far as Freudian psychoanalysis is concerned, it 
25 Cf. Baxley 2015. p. 237. 
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identifies perversion as one of the major clinical structures besides neurosis/hysteria 
and psychosis. In Lacanian psychoanalytical theory, these structures represent the pos-
sible avatars (Schicksale) of the drives (Triebe) deriving from the castration complex. 
As such they represent different ways to cope with a primally repressed "pernicious 
enjoyment" (Lacan 1991, p. 52) which is the necessary libidinal remainder resulting 
from the institution of the super-ego (Über-Ich) as inner agent and executor of the 
moral law within the individual, i. e. from the individual's subjectivation. Thereby, 
as Freud explains in Civilization and its Discontents (Das Unbehagen in der Kultur), 
morality is based on a self-sustaining and indeed self-aggravating libido-economic 
logic: Tue super-ego parasitically feeds on the pathological satisfaction which it its-
elf prohibits. Tue super-ego derives its strength from the libidinal energy of what it 
prohibits. And so what Kant admitted as pathological 'surrogate' of moral reason, 
namely compassion (if only it is 'not commanded' but 'cultivated'), reveals itself as 
a quite unbehaglich, discontentful constituent of morality, namely in the form of an 
apriori compassion-ofoneself (rather than with-oneself), imposed as it always alrea-
dy is by the social other. So from a Freudian perspective, Kant's 'strength of reason' 
is in pathological deficit right from the start. Tue more pathological satisfaction the 
super-ego prohibits, however, the stronger it gets, and the stronger it gets, the more 
it prohibits, and so on. Now to conceive ofhow this spiral logic is set into motion, 
one must logically presuppose, firstly, a primordial moment in which the moral law 
would have been originally imposed, that is forced upon the subject, and, second-
ly, a concomitant primordially prohibited enjoyment. This is the enjoyment of a 
pathological object whose only function it would be to serve the institution of this 
prohibitory law. Tue concomitant state of mind would be identical with the derer-
mination of the will by that law. 
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In conrradistinction to simple pleasure, Lacan at one point starts to reserve the 
term 'Jouissance" (Lacan 1967, 30.05.67, p. 274f.) for this enjoyment insofar as it 
is logically, ethically and aesthetically 'extimate' (included/excluded) to a subjecti-
vity thence twisted by this extimacy.26 And Lacan ranges rhe literary work of Kanr's 
contemporary Marquis de Sade among rhe ancient ethical traditions in philosophy, 
e. g. Stoicism or Peripateticism, insofar as it would provide a noteworthy access to 
rhe experience of this enjoyment. (Lacan 2006a, p. 645) According to Freudian and 
Lacanian psychoanalysis some of antiquiry's ethical schools, just like various Christian 
virtue doctrines, ultimately projected this enjoymenr onto a Supreme Being, onto 
a fatherlike, almighty God, onro an Other who is the, as it were, Subject Supposed 
to Enjoy. As to Lacan, de Sade's La philosophie dans le boudoir supplements Kant's 
Critique of practical reason with its "truth" (ibid., p. 646)-and we should add: a 
truth about rhe enjoyment of this supreme Other which for Lacan turns out to be 
the unconscious as the discourse to which the subject is subjected. In a similar vein, 
Julia Kristeva speaks of a "logic of the intimare" which would work the Kantian 
'practical' rcason from wirhin and which rhe literary work of de Sade would "srage 
[ ... ) by illustrating how the intimate of the passionate and.sensitive soul, because it 
finds itself under the empire of judging Reason and his de-sensitizing and unifying 
power, is an intimate which is condemned to enjoy this force" 27 (Kristeva 1997, p. 76). 
lt is wirh his theorem about the radical "propensity [Hang]" to do evil in Religion 
within the Boundaries of Mere Reason thar Kant had earlier approached rhis 'pleasure 
26
, In the contexr of his concept of rhe 1hing (la Chose) Lacan speaks of an imimare exrerioricy ( ''exthioriti intime') 
and of extimiry ( ''extimite') (Lacan 1986, p. 167). 
27 My rranslaüon. 
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in the law itself' (Kant 2007, 07: 265). 28 Besides, with respect to the provocations 
in de Sade's writings one might want to follow Lacan's text on Kant with Sade and 
argue that Kant's theory of evil can actually come to terms with de Sade, given that 
de Sade's work would stay within an (anti-)virtue-ethical framework. As to Lacan, 
"[h]is [de Sade's] apology for crime merely impels him to an oblique acceptance of 
rhe Law. Tue Supreme Being is restored in Evil Action [le Malifice]" (Lacan 2006a, 
p. 667). As far as Kant's Religion is concerned, it is the subject's "free power of choice 
[freien Willkür]" from which "depravity [Bösartigkeit]", which can also be called 
"perversity [Verkehrtheit] (perversitas)" (Kant 1996b, p. 83; Kant 2007, 06: 037), 
ultimately derives-depraviry respectively perversiry tobe understood not as the 
simple propensiry to yield to one's natural inclinations but as rhe formal "propensity 
of the power of choice [Willkür] to maxims that subordinate the incentives of rhe 
moral law to others (not moral ones)" (Kant 1996b, p. 78; Kant 2007, 06: 030). 
As a somewhat paradoxical "innate guilt [angeborene Schuld]" perversity "must no-
netheless have originated from freedom [aus der Freiheit entsprungen]" (Kant l 996b, 
p. 84; Kant 2007, 06: 038). For Kant there is "no conceivable ground for us, there-
fore, from which moral evil could first have come in us [kein begreiflicher Grund da, 
woher das moralische Böse in uns zuerst gekommen sein könne]" (Kant l 996b, p. 88; 
Kant 2007, 06: 043). 
And even though "the concept of freedom [ ... ] first and foremost derives from 
this law", i. e. from the moral law as freedom's ratio cognoscendi, i. e. even though 
"the concept of the freedom of the power of choice [der Begriff der Freiheit der Will-
kür] does not precede in us the consciousness of the moral law but is only inferred 
28 Cf. Zac 1972, p. 153. 
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from the determinability of our power of choice rhrough this law as unconditional 
command" (Kant l 996b, p. 93 Fn. *; Kant 2007, 06: 049), this for Kant cannot 
mean that "rhe freedom of the power of choice", "Freiheit der Willkür", and thus 
evil would also be ontologically grounded in the consciousness of the moral law (as 
i ts ratio essendi). 
Consequently, and given that for Kant there just cannot be a 'pleasure in the law 
itself', there can be no pleasure in the opposition to the law itself either. Hence there 
can be no "evil reason [boshafte Vernunft]" in which "resistance ro the law would itself 
be thereby elevated to incentive [Triebfeder] (for without any incentive the power 
of choice cannot be determined)". This is because in being "so the subject would be 
made a diabolical being" which according ro Kant "is however not applicable to the 
human being" (Kant 1996b, p. 82; Kant 2007, 06: 035). 
4. Tue Aesthetics of Rationalization: Disgust, Boredom and Humour 
As Kant thus ignores or rather pushes aside the possibility of perverse enjoyment 
within morality, he accordingly misjudges "[ ... ] rhe aesthetic constitution [ästhetische 
Beschaffenheit], the temperament so ro speak of virtue", roo, conceiving of it as a "joy-
ous frame of mind rjröhliche Gemüthsstimmung]", a "heart joyous in the compliance 
with its duty (not just complacency [Behaglichkeit] in the recognition of it)" (Kant 
1996b, p. 73 Fn. t; Kant 2007, 06: 023 Fn. t) 29 • Kant detects, it is true, something 
"very ambiguous", i. e. some moral ambiguity within "the self-torment of a remor-
seful sinner". Bur this turns out ro be unproblematic because it "usually [is] only an 
inward reproach for having offended against prudence" (ibid.). lt is the usual seif-
29 CE Zac 1972. p. 147. 
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reproach of the offender for not having been clever enough (since he gor caught). This 
is obviously not a moral disposition betraying a secret perverse enjoyment. And so 
for Kant this just fits all roo weil with a "slavish frame of mind [sklavische Gemüths-
stimmung]" of those who, rather unambiguously, arc just "weighcd-down by fear 
and dejected" and likewise "never [ ... ] without a hidden hatred of the law [nie ohne 
einen verborgenenen Haß des Gesetzes]" (ibid.) ro which they feel themselves subjected. 
To this analysis of Kant one would have to object roday with Lacan that at least in 
the case of masochism "the masochist is not" a mere "slave [esclave]" of the law (La-
can 1967, 30.05.67, p. 276f.).30 Nor is it that the 'slavish frame of mind' would boil 
down ro the simple question ofbeing clever enough or not. Rather, such a mindset 
reveals the subject-the subject of the unconscious-as being more than just de-
ver. Tue masochistic subject of the unconscious is all-roo-clever, a clever-clever "old 
fox [un petit malin]" (ibid.) according to Lacan, since it is precisely in the act of 
submitting ro the law and its punishment that he or she finds enjoyment. As Lacan 
states: "the masochist knows that he is within enjoyment [le masochiste sait qu'il est 
dans la jouissance]" (ibid.). 
Be this as it may, Kant's Critique of practical reason sides with the derided "Sroic" 
who refuses to recognize anything evil in some "paroxysms of gout" which to him 
must appear as a merely physical pain: 
A bad thing [Übel] it certainly was, and his cry betrayed that; but that any evil [ein Böses] attached 
to him thereby, this he had no reason whatever to admit, for pain did not in the least diminish the 
worth of his person, but only that of his condition. If he had been conscious of a single lie it would 
have lowered his pride, but pain served only to elevate him [ihn zu erheben], when he was conscious 
that he had not deserved it by any unrighteous action by which he had rendered himself worthy of 
punishment. (Kant 1889, p. 15lf.; Kant 2007, 05: 060) 31 
30 My translarion . 
.ll Translation modified. 
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In contrast to the Stoies who moralized the whole of physical reality, Kant is surely 
more than critical of the tendency of "human reason [ ... ] to link the course of na-
ture with the laws of morality [den Lauf der Natur an die Gesetze der Moralität an-
zuknüpfen]" (Kant 1996b 114 Fn. *;Kant 2007, 06: 073 Fn. *).32 Correspondingly, 
he makes a sharp distinction between the spheres of morality and of physical reality, 
i. e. pathology. Still for Kant these two extremes, the Stoic's cosmotheistic and his 
own quasi-monotheistic view, converge in the idea of an ideal elevation, Erhebung, a 
genuinely "moral apathy, moralische Apathie" which would be cleansed of all patholo-
gical activity ('lies', punishable 'unrighteous actions', etc.) as much as of all patholo-
gical passivity ("bluntness, Fühllosigkeit", "listlessness, subjective Gleichgültigkeit" and 
"indifference, Indifferenz" (Kant 1886, p. 226; Kant 2007, 06: 408)).33Aesthetically, 
Kant's 'moral apathy' should thus be free of the boredom (Langeweile) which cha-
racterizes, according to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, the "general terms beyond 
which Stoicism cannot get", for instance "[t]heTrue and the Good, wisdom and 
virtue". For Hegel, these Stoic terms are "lacking the fullness of life"; they are "no 
doubt elevating [erhebend], but since they cannot in fact produce any expansion of 
the content, they soon become boring rJangen sie bald arf: Langeweile zu machen]" 
(Hegel 1977, p. 122).34 
32 On Kant and Scoicism cf. Schneewind 1996, 292ff„ parcicularly p. 294. Cf. also Sancozki 2006, p. 508, who acgues 
chat despite many parallels Kant's critical philosophy was developed without subscanrial recourse to ancient Stoicism: 
"Wenn man ihn [Kant] überhaupt in eine antike Richtung einordnen kann, dann ist die Stoa zu nennen. Er selbst hätte sich 
als kritischer Philosoph al/.erdings sicher gegen derartige Zuschreibungen gewehrt. [..}Negativ konnte der Gang durch die drei 
Kritiken jeweils begründet zeigen, dass eine genuine Auseinandersetzung mit der Antike for die Genese der grund/.egenden 
Prämissen der jeweiligen Theorien keine Rol/.e spielt." 
33 Translation modified. Cf. Assmann 2003, passim, for ehe distinction berween monocheism and cosmotheism. 
34 Tcanslacion modified. 
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Against this background it must have been unthinkable for Kant that the pain-
trodden's sage elevation, Erhebung, might secretly contain a malign (i. e. all-too-cle-
verly evil) pleasure as an added extra, as a pernicious surplus enjoyment, for instance 
a kind of elevated self-pity. But then how would Kant have judged the legendary 
apathetic self-contentment of the Stoic "[ ... ] Epictetus who, when his master was 
twisting his leg, said, smiling and unmoved, 'You will break my leg', and when it 
was broken, he added, 'Did I not teil you that you would break it?'" (Origen 2001, 
chap. LIII). Is not Epictetus' jovial countenance in face of a pain unjustly suffered 
an extreme form of what Kant had in mind when he praised "contentment (ac-
quiescentia)" as an "enjoyment analogous to the self-sufficiency which we can ascri-
be only to the Supreme Being" in the Critique of Practical Reason?35 Actually, it is 
not. For Kant sees a limit to moral elevation beyond which man's "moral capacity" 
becomes "fancifully" exaggerated and thus "nonsense" (Kant 200la, p. 32). And it 
is precisely some famous Stoies which Kant-as quoted by Herder-has in mind 
here: "Seneca was an impostor, Epictetus strange and fanciful." (Ibid.) 36 However, 
can Kant's moral apathy, the subject's countenance, based as it is on reason's practi-
ca! law only and on a solitary Pflichtvorstellung ('representation of duty on its own'), 
be said to be free of all fancies? 
35 See above (Kant 1889, p. 215). 
36 Schneewind 1996, p. 292 quoces ehe whole passage from which chis phrase is taken: "Man fancifully exaggerates 
his moral capaciry and sets before himself the most perfect goodness; ehe outcome is nonsense; but what is required of 
us? Tue Scoic's answer: 1 shall raise myself above myself, „. rise superior eo my own affiiccions and needs, and wich all 
my might be good, be the image of godhood. But how so, for godhood has no obligations, yet you cercainly do„. Now 
ehe god departs and we are lefr wich man, a poor creature, loaded with obügacions. Seneca was an impostor, Epictetus 
strange and fanciful" (Cf. Kant 2001a, p. 32). Schneewind cesumes Kant's relacionship to Stoicism as follows: "Kant's 
reservations about Stoicism were as pervasive as his appreciation of it" (ibid.). 
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!nterestingly, for Freud's Psychopathology of Everyday Lift section on Erroneously 
carried out actions, it is precisely the "srriking countenance [Fassung] which the pati-
ents show" in the face of"apparently accidental injuries" which "in the more serious 
cases of psychoneuroses" may "berray the portion of unconscious intention" causally 
involved therein. An analysis of ehe respective unconscious intention regularly reveals 
thac chese "precended accidents" in rruch "are really self-inflicced" and "sympcoms 
of ehe disease". Behind the seeming "calmness, Ruhe" we must: according eo Freud, 
suppose an unconscious and "constantly lurking tendency co self-punishment [ ... ] 
which skilfully, makes use of an external situation" (Freud 1922, p. l 98f.). 37 This 
self-punishment resulcs in a pernicious enjoyment through which ehe subject (of the 
unconscious) communicates wich itself. Freud's exemplary case in the Psychopathology 
is a young married woman who 
[ ... ] broke her leg below the knee in a carriage accidenr so that she was bedridden for weeks. Tue 
striking part of it was ehe lack of any manifestation of pain and ehe calmness [Ruhe] wich which she 
bore her misforcune. 1his calamity ushered in a long and serious neurotic illness, from which she was 
finally cured by psychotherapy. During ehe treatment 1 discovered ehe circumstances surrounding 
ehe accident, as well as certain impressions which preceded it. Tue young woman with her jealous 
husband spent some time on ehe farm of her married sister, in company wich her numerous orher 
brothers and sisters wich their wives and husbands. One evening she gave an exhibition of one of 
her talenrs before this intimate circle; she danced artistically ehe 'cancan', eo ehe great delight of her 
relatives, but to ehe great annoyance of her husband, who afterward whispered to her, 'Again you 
have behaved like a prostitute'. Tue words took effect; we will leave it undecided whecher it was just 
on account of ehe dance. That night she was restless [unruhig] in her sleep, and ehe ncxt forcnoon 
she decided to go out driving. She chose ehe horses herself, refusing one team and demanding ano-
ther. Her youngest sister wished to have her baby wich its nurse accompany her, but she opposed 
this vehemently. During ehe drive she was nervous; she reminded ehe coachman that ehe horses were 
getting skittish, and as ehe fidgety [unruhigen] animals really produced a momentary difficulty she 
jumped from ehe carriage in fright and broke her leg, while those remaining, in the carriage were 
uninjured. Although afrer ehe disclosure of these details we can hardly doubt that this accidenr was 
really contrived, we cannot fail to admire ehe skill which forced the accident to mete out a punish-
ment so suicable to the crime. For as it happened 'cancan' dancing with her became impossible for 
a long time" (ibid., p. l 99f.). 
37 Translation modified. 
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Here self-communication adopts the cwisted form of an acting out of an uncon-
scious phantasy of self-punishment. Ir is rooted in what can be called a sympcomatic 
'compassion-of-oneself'. "[!] n our present state of civilization", writes Freud in 1904, 
"[t]he self-inflicted injury which does not entirely tend coward self-annihilation has 
[ ... ] no other choice [ ... ) than to hide itselfbehind the accidental [ ... ]. Formerly, it 
was a cuscomary sign of mourning, at other times it expressed itself in ideas of piety 
[Frömmigkeit] and renunciation of the world [Weltentsagung]." (Ibid., p. 199 Fn. 1) 
lt is known, of course, how Kant repeatedly denounces Schwärmerei and other 
ambiguous forms of moral pathology like e. g. bigotry. And it has been evidenced 
above how much Kanc's moral subject is supposed co differ from that through its 
'joyous frame of mind' etc. Yet in Kant's later philosophy traces of a symptomatic 
enjoyment at ehe roots of moral subjectivity can be detected, coo. A comparison wich 
de Sade is helpful here, following Lacan's cexc on Kant with Sade, for it suggests that 
the elevated and self-content enjoyment of the virtuous subject would turn into, so 
CO speak, 'moral' disgust under de Sadean conditions: "Imagine a revival of Epic-
tetus in Sadean experience: 'You see, you broke it', he says, pointing to his leg. To 
reduce jouissance co ehe misery of an effect in which one's quest stumbles-doesn't 
this transform it into disgust?" (Lacan 2006a, p. 651) And as Jacques Derrida sug-
gests in Economimesis, "ehe experience of disgust" cogether with "the scheme of vo-
miting" (Derrida 1981, p. 21) mark ehe blind spot of Kant's rationalistic moralism. 
Or rather it occupies "[ ... ] wichin ehe Kantian system a strategic point that unites 
1 
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all faculcies'', as Winfried Menninghaus convincingly argues (Menninghaus 2003, 
p. 114).38 lt is in Kam's own concepcion of disgusc indeed where his contradictory 
Statements on ehe paradoxical copic of a 'commanded feeling', a 'pleasure in ehe law 
itself' or an 'enjoyment of duties' converge-statements like: that ehe determinati-
on of the will by ehe moral law 'imposes itself (sich au/dringt)' and thac Achtung is 
the 'moral pleasure' resulcing from this imposition; thac it is 'contrary co the nature 
of duty to enjoy having duties incumbent upon one'; chat 'an obligation co enjoy-
ment is a manifest absurdiry', just like it 'cannot be commanded' co have a certain 
'affection' like e. g. 'love'. 
This is not least because disgusc (including possible variants) is the only form of 
forced enjoyment that Kant openly admics (again Achtung and its reverse, humilia-
tion, notwithstanding). In ehe Critique of judgement, § 48 dealing wich ehe Relation 
of Genius to Taste, Kant defines disgust, Ekel, as ehe"[ ... ) peculiar sensation, which 
rests on mere imagination, [in which) ehe object is represented as [if) it were impo-
sing itself for our enjoyment [all ob er sich zum Genusse aufdränge] while we strive 
against icwich all our mighc" (Kant 1914, p. 195; Kant 2007, 05: 312).39 As itwere, 
disgust is a feeling which commands itself to us. Tue aestfietic resulc according to 
Kant is that in disgusc, Ekel, "the artistic representation of ehe object is no longer 
distinguished from ehe nature of ehe object itself in our sensation", which is to say 
thac an imaginary !et alone symbolic distancing of ehe object is impossible. Thus 
disgust is the singular "kind of ugliness which cannot be represented in accordance 
38 On Kam's concept of disgusr cf. Menninghaus 2003, panicularly pp. 103-120. Menninghaus observes that „[t] 
he sensation of disgusr judges, as it were, on physical, aesrhetic, and moral levels, thus occupying-very much like rhe 
sensation ofbeauty-within the Kancian sysrem a srrategic poinc that unites all faculties. lt supplemencs the purely the-
oretical critique with a test of taste-with a dietetic organon judging all sorrs of 'food for the incellect'." (lbid„ p. l 14f.) 
39 Translation modified. 
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with nature". lt cannot be forborn because it cuts through any kind ofimaginary or 
symbolic distancing. Disgust is a formation of ehe 'real' in Lacan's sense. Therefore 
it ruins ("zu Grunde zu richten") "all aesthetical satisfaction [ästhetische Wohlgefal-
len] and consequencly artificial beauty [Kunstschönheit]" (ibid.). As disgust collapses 
ehe difference between sensation and representation, it also tends to collapse the 
difference between ehe subject and the disgustful object-be it a suffering human 
being. From an aesthetical point of view, it thus marks ehe blind spot of the ethi-
cally and logically necessary self-implication of ehe morally judging subject into his 
own systematized rationalizations. Through disgust, ehe moral subject is blinded and 
thus beyond good and evil. Yet at the same time, we may presume, disgust is just 
the extreme reverse side of compassion and chus is related to ehe very possibility of 
practical reason; as surrogate or supplement of moraliry's truth, it kicks ehe solitary 
Pflichtvorstellung into ehe fullness oflife. Moreover, we can conclude that in analogy 
to ehe feeling of Achtung, which is a feeling "ehe necessity of which we can discern 
(einsehen)", in the case of disgust it is necessity as such, i. e. the necessity of subjecti-
vation, i. e. moraliry's ultima ratio, which becomes an object of aesthetic experience. 
Thus it appears that in Kant's moral philosophy disgust is the-ugly-truth of ehe 
"necessiry, indeed urgency" of "a demand of moraliry itself", namely of "finding a 
sensible representation ofmorality" (Guyer 1993, p. 178).40 
4° Cf. Menninghaus: "While virmally all pertinem scholarly work on Kant focuses on the duality of the sublime and 
the beautiful, rhe Kamian sysrem is in fact distinguished by a triad-that of'the feelings of the sublime, rhe beautiful, 
and the disgusting'. This triad proves tobe highly functional with regard to the paradigm ofphilosophical organa. [ ... ] 
Tue beautiful and sublime positively compensate for theoretical deficits of foundation and practical deficits of motiva-
tion; the feeling of disgust warns us away, and shelters us in negative-apotropaic fashion, from giving in to what would 
be opposite to the (groundless) good or the (unknowable) purposiveness of nature. As an effect of cultivation, such 
desirable achievements do not constitue a miraculous natural phenomenon,-proving chat the human being is namrally 
good in essence. Rather: to speak with Freud, in the end these positive functions of disgusr are instituted by the supere-
go" (Menninghaus 2003, p. 116). 
1 
39 
Wolfram Bergande 
Aesthetically speaking again, this ultimate necessity appears here in a most 'acci-
dental' (Freud) form, namely in a form which, in everyday experience, is as pervasive 
as it is unpredictable: boredom. And just as disgust is ehe reverse side of compassion, 
Mitleid, and by the same coken ehe discontentful double of respect, Achtung, so ana-
logously is boredom ehe discontentful (unbehaglich) double ofKant's moral apachy. 
For it is "disgusc" chac, in Kant's Anthropology, essentially defines "boredom". Bore-
dom, lange Weile, wrices Kant, boils down co disgusc or nausea, given thac boredom 
is ehe "disgust [Anekelung] wich one's own existence, which arises when ehe mind 
is empty of ehe sensations coward which it incessancly strives [aus der Leerheit des 
Gemüths an Empfindungen, zu denen es unaufhörlich strebt, der langen Weile]" (Kant 
2006, p. 43; Kant 2007, 07: 152). In ocher words: boredom is ehe disgust, Ekel, feie 
on the occasion of a permanencly frustrated striving for sensations. As we have eve-
ry reason co suspect here, boredom or disgust become morally relevant precisely in 
cases where ehe 'representation of duty on its own', emptied as it is of all 'pachologi-
cal' determinations, would not accomplish ehe practical decermination of ehe will. 
So we can furcher presume that it is through ehe aesthetical (i. e. ultimately: 
pachological) feelings of disgust and/or boredom that "[t]he rule of ehe Judgement 
according to laws of pure practical reason" (i. e. ehe categorical imperative) can in-
deed get suspended, a rule which obliges eo "ask yourself whecher, if ehe accion you 
propose were to take place by a law of the system of nature of which you were your-
self a parc, you could regard it as possible by your own will. Everyone does, in fact, 
decide by chis rule whether actions are morally good or evil" (Kant 1889, p. 161; 
Kant 2007, 05: 069). Affected by disgusc/boredom, ehe Kantian subject, like ehe 
Sc~ic, simply cannot ask him- or herself whether he or she 'could regard' ehe propo-
40 
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sed action 'as possible by his or her own will'41 • This is because it is precisely disgust/ 
boredom which masks boch ehe self-implication of ehe subjecc's will into ehe moral 
law (conceived of in analogy co a 'system of nature') and ehe unconscious (quasi-
natural, quasi-pathological) "pre-determinism" of ehe will resulting from it; how such 
pre-determinism could possibly "co-exist wich freedom" is something which, as co 
Kant's Religion, "we want eo discern [einsehen], but we never shall" (Kant 2006, p. 94, 
Fn. *;Kant 2007, 06: 049). 
lt cannoc be discerned, in any case, unless ehe subject stops ignoring his or her 
as it were 'moral' disgust, which is compassion in its mosc extreme, namely ics most 
debased form. If, as Kant claims, in disgust 'ehe artistic representation of ehe object 
is no langer distinguished from the nature of ehe object itself in our sensation', i. e. 
if not even the artistic representation can temper disgust, chen a fortiori we may con-
clude chat accually any representation of ehe (disgusting) object 'is no langer distingu-
ished from ehe nature of ehe object icself in our sensation'. Such 'moral' disgust thus 
makes it impossible co decide whether a sympathetic affect springs from intuition 
or racher from reason, i. e. whecher from 'pathological' infection by a social ocher 
('humanitas aesthetica') or racher from the subject's 'practical' free will ('humanitas 
practica'). Thus in ehe experience of disgust ehe subject can no langer decide whether 
its 'represemation of dury', Pflichtvorstellung, is 'pathological' or 'practical'. For it is 
only in pure "chinking" chac 1 can imagine chac "I amfree, because 1 am not in an 
other, but remain simply and solely in communion with myself [schlechthin bei mir 
selbst bleibe], [„ .)"; nothing buc "[„ .) my activity in conceptual thinking is a mo-
vement wichin myself [meine Bewegung in Begriffen ist eine Bewegung in mir selbst]", 
41 Cf. Cooper 1996, p. 266. 
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as Hegel remarks in the Phenomenology wich respect to (not only) ancient Stoicism. 
As Hegel explains, this is because "[ ... ] in the case of a representation [Vorstellung], 
[ ... ] consciousness still has specially to bear in mind that this is its representation 
[Vorstellung]; on the contrary, the concept [Begrif.ß is for me srraighraway my concept 
[Begrif.ß" (Hegel 1977, p. 120). 42 Disgust breaks up this rational self-communion. 
So besides veiling the self-implication of the moral subject into its object and be-
sides blurring the distincrion between pathological and moral compassion, disgust 
lastly makes it impossible even to discern whether the Pflichtvorstellung really is the 
subject's very own representation or not, and whether it is a representation of a con-
cept or a representation in the sensuous, aesthetic sense. 
Screenshot from The Amputee (1974) directed by David Lynch 
42 Translation modified. 
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While the Pflichtvorstellung tends to become indiscernible in the experience of dis-
gust, and despite Kant's verdict about the impossible artification of disgustful objects, 
there are nevertheless artistic srrategies to counter the symptomatic knot interlacing 
disgust, apathetic boredom and painful compassion. David Lynch's The Amputee of 
197 4 artistically stages and exposes such symptomatic feelings as they eventually 
mask an unconscious over-determinarion. Tue objective humor involved in Lynch's 
short film communicates something unfathomable which cannot be discerned, it is 
rrue, but which can be enjoyed and thus sensed. 
1 43 
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